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Abstract. In this paper we investigate the implications of assuming that citizens are cog-
nitively constrained for transparency in public life. We model cognitive limitations as reflecting
a quantum property of people’s mental representations of the world. There exists a multiplicity
of incompatible (Bohr) complementary mental representations of a situation. As a consequence
the framing of information plays a crucial role. We show that additional information can be
detrimental to a quantum cognitively constrained agent: he may become more confused. We
suggest some implications for the design of a public agency’s website.
Keywords: learning, quantum cognition, transparency.
AMS classification: 81Q99, 91C99.
Introduction
Transparency is among the most debated issues in modern public life. The development of
information technology has given rise to hopes for a modern truly democratic state based on
transparency. As noted by Beth Noveck [18], real applications have fallen short for those hopes.
In part we suggest that this may be due to a narrow understanding of the concept of transparency.
This paper is a contribution to the exploration of the links between access to information and
transparency. The starting point is the recognition that access to information is not equivalent
1 Contribution presented at Quantum Interaction - 2014, Lihn in Filzbach, Switzerland, June 30th
to July 4th, 2014. To be published in Springer Lectures Notes in Computer Science.
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to transparency. Instead transparency is intimately related to learning. In this paper we suggest
that a quantum approach to information processing by human receptors may shed some fruitful
light on the public debate as well as provide insights of value for practical applications.
The information system community, among others, was early aware that in addition to the
physical constraints, the transmission of information e.g., about a new information system, is
conditioned by cognitive limitations. Appealing to cognitive scientists they formulate those
limitations in terms of “mental models”, “cognitive frames” or “scripts” that simultaneously enable
and constrain understanding. Gioia writes about “definitions of (organizational) reality that
serve as vehicule for understanding and action” (Gioia [9], p.50). “They include assumptions,
knowledge and expectations expressed symbolically through language, visual images, metaphors
and stories. Frames are flexible in content and structure having variable dimensions that skift
in salience and content by context and over time” (Orlikowsky and Gash [19]).
In economics, we talk about “framing effects” when alternative descriptions of one and the
same decision problem induce different decisions from agents. Kahneman and Tversky [13] ad-
dress framing effects by making the crucial point that “the true objects of evaluation are neither
objects in the real world nor verbal descriptions of those objects; they are mental representa-
tions”. To capture this feature, framing effects have been modelled as the “process of constructing
a representation” as a measurement performed on the (quantum) state of the agent (Lambert-
Mogiliansky, Zamir and Zwirn [16]). In Lambert-Mogiliansky and Busemeyer [14], we show how
this approach is consistent with a number of central theories in psychology including e.g., Self
perception and provides a tractable approach to questions related to identity and self-control.
In this paper, we introduce element of a theory of learning based on those premises and suggest
that it provides a fruitful way to capture some of the above mentioned concerns expressed by
practitioners.
We propose that the cognitive process involved in information processing includes two steps:
i. receiving information framed according to some representation; ii processing information in
terms of ones preferred representation. This learning process is not Bayesian as soon as we allow
for Bohr complementarity of representations. The issue of learning by non-classically minded
agents has been approached in Danilov and Lambert Mogiliansky [4, 5] and more recently in
Busemeyer and Bruza [1].
A central result in learning theory is that Bayesian updating (under weak conditions) con-
verges to the truth. However critics have been raised on several aspects of Bayesianism (see e.g.
Gilboa, Postlewaite and Schmeidler [11]. Departures from Bayesian updating may occur because
they undervalue or overvalue priors (e.g., Epstein Noor Sandroni [8]). Alternative approaches
have been developed in connection with Maxmin Expected Utility (Gilboa and Schmeidler [10])
and Multriple priors (Hanany and Klibanoff[12]). Our approach implies a novel departure from
Bayesian updating appealing to the recent success of the quantum formalism in psychology and in
social sciences (for a survey of recent advances see Khrenikov [15] and Busemeyer and Bruza [1].
1) Learning by non-classically minded agents
It is a common place that human beings are not capable of holding very complex picture
in mind (cf “small worlds” in Savage 1954). They consider reality focusing on one perspective
at a time and show difficulty switching perspective as amply documented. What the quantum
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approach entails is that this inability to seize reality in its full richness has far reaching conse-
quences beyond incomplete knowledge. When the perspectives are incompatible in the agent’s
mind, his understanding of reality does not look like a puzzle that is assembled progressively,
instead the evolution of the picture of reality is subjected to disturbances (discrete jumps) which
entails specific properties of the learning process.
In the present context the parallel with QM can be described as follows: the system is the
subjective picture about the world, it is a psychic object. To gain information on the mental
picture of the world two things can be done. One may add some information about the outside
world. And one may perform a measurement of the picture by means of introspection. New
information about the world transforms the picture (in a way similar to a preparation procedure).
Thereafter, the agent processes information i.e., he “updates” his beliefs. This is modeled as a
measurement that projects the new state (picture) onto one of the possible pictures defined by
his preferred representation (see below).
Figure 1 is a well-known ambiguous picture. The mind may perceive a rabbit or a a duck.
Both pictures are complete representations of the drawing: they confer a “meaning” to every
detail. The brain oscillates between the two or settle for either one of them but cannot perceive
both simultaneously. Both pictures are true but they are incompatible in the mind.
Figure 1. What do you see ?
1.1) The basic model
Let the state (of understanding) of an agent be called a mental picture, we denote it |ϕ〉 ∈ H
where H is the Hilbert space of mental pictures of the (relevant) world. The present analysis ad-
dresses uncertainty exclusively linked to quantum indeterminacy reflecting cognitive constraints
i.e., we shall be working exclusively with pure states. A distinctive feature of non-classical sys-
tems is the existence of dispersed pure states referred to as “intrinsic uncertainty”. It is closely
related to two other features of non-classical systems: the existence of incompatible measure-
ments and the impact of the measurements on the state. 2
2If a state is dispersion-free, i.e., the outcome of every possible measurement is uniquely determined, there is
no reason for the state to change. If all pure states are dispersion-free then measurements do not impact on pure
states and therefore all measurements are compatible. On the contrary, if a state is dispersed then by necessity it
will be modified by an appropriate measurement. On the other hand, the change in a pure state is the reason for

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• The notion of measurement
Before entering into the analysis let us remind of some basic notions and how they relate to
our issue. Generally, a measurement is an interaction between a system and some measurement
device, which yields some result, the outcome of the measurement that we can observe and record.
Two measurements are compatible if they, roughly speaking, can be performed simultaneously
or more precisely, if the performance of one measurement does not affect the result of the other.
In our context a measurement is an introspective operation that acts on the agent’s mental
picture. The agent’s asks himself a question and an answer, the outcome of the mental process is
brought to consciousness. We propose that the cognitive limitations documented by practitioners
can be modelled as the result of incompatible mental operations that act on the mental picture.
• A preferred frame.
We shall assume that the agent seeks information because he has some concern in mind e.g.,
he wants to make a decision. This assumption is consistent with psychological and neurobiological
evidence that human cognitive processes (including perception) are structured by some form of
intentionality.
Generally, a representation is an observable R with eigenvalues {r1, ...rn} interpreted as the
possible “eigenpictures” belonging the representation R3. The agent’s state, a mental picture can
written as a superposition of the possible eigenpictures in any representations of the (relevant)
world:
|ϕ〉 =
∑
i
λi|ri〉,
∑
j
λ2i = 1, λi ∈ R.
A decision problem is defined as a correspondance from D : H → A where H is the space of
mental pictures of the world and A the set of actions. For each (mentally represented) state of
the world, it defines which actions the agent wants to undertake.
Hypothesis 1
There exists a representation R∗ such that D is a coarsening of R∗.4
Hypothesis 1 implies that if the agent receives (maximal) information framed in represen-
tation R∗ he will know exactly what to do. We also say that R∗ is fully congruent with D.
Generally, D has a lower dimensionality than H, i.e., distinct eigenpictures can induce the same
action.
• The cognitive process.
In our context, it is in place to explicitly decompose the cognitive process of learning into
two steps:
Step 1: Preparation
The first step of the mental process is gaining information expressed within some representa-
tion R 6= R∗ (or frame - we use the terms interchangeably) . It corresponds to a fully deterministic
evolution of the mental picture. It operates on the initial state(picture) so as to project it onto
incompatibility of measurements. The initial outcome of a first measurement is not repeated because the system
has been modified by a second measurement (see Danilov and Lambert-Mogiliansky [4, 5]).
3All the representations R, R∗, etc. that we consider in this contribution have eigenspaces of dimension exactly
equal to one. All these eigenstates are maximal information states for the individual.
4A measurement M ′ is coarser than M if every eigenset of M is contained in some eigenset of M ′, see Danilov
and Lambert-Mogiliansky [4, 5] p. 334.
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the one eigenpicture reflecting the information content provided (see below for a concrete exam-
ple). In the terminology of QM it resembles a process of preparation5: |ϕ〉 → |ϕ′〉 = |ri〉, where
|ri〉 is an eigenpicture of the R representation.
Step 2: Measurement
After having received the information, the agent processes information i.e., updates his mental
picture (ri) with respect to his preferred representation R
∗. This is a non-deterministic evolution
which we model as a measurement. We first express |ϕ′〉 = |ri〉 in terms of the eigenpictures of
the preferred representation, R∗, |ri〉 =
∑
j γj |r∗j 〉 applying R∗ we obtain
R∗|ϕ′〉 → |r∗j 〉 with probability γ2j .
We see that after completing the cognitive process corresponding to interpreting the information
in his own mental model, the agent’s actual state of information is some |r∗j 〉 6= |ri〉. The two
states are not mutually exclusive (orthogonal) but they are incompatible in his mind which
captures the cognitive limitation.
1.2) Analysis: the value of new information
We now develop a simple argument showing that information can increase the agent’s relevant
uncertainty. Uncertainty (intrinsic) is measured by the entropy of dispersion6 in terms of the
preferred representation: let |ϕ〉 = ∑j νj |r∗j 〉, since γ2j is the probability for obtaining eigenpicture
|r∗j 〉 after the measurement R∗, the (intrinsic) uncertainty associated with ϕ is defined
H (ϕ) = −
∑
j
ν2j log ν
2
j
For the purpose of the argument, we shall assume that the agent’s mental state is initially an
eigenpicture of his preferred representation|ϕ〉 = |r∗2〉. This state reflects information that is
perfectly congruent with R∗ but is not framed in R∗ 7. But the agent is not aware of r∗2 unless
he updates "his beliefs" which corresponds to the (measurement) operation of R∗ . If he did, he
would obtain
R∗|ϕ〉 = |r∗2〉
He would then be fully determined with respect to the decision problem. There would not be
any (relevant) uncertainty left with ν2 = 1 we have H (ϕ) = 0. But assume that instead he
acquires new information relative to another but related aspects of the issue. We denote this
representation P. This corresponds to steps 1 of the cognitive process above. The mental state
|ϕ〉 is prepared into |ϕ′〉 equal to some |pi〉. "Enriched" with this new information, the agent now
updates his mental picture with respect to his preferred representation (step 2):
|ϕ′〉 = |p2〉 =
∑
j
γj |r∗j 〉 → any|r∗j 〉 with probability γ2j 6= 1
We see that while he previously potentially “knew” r∗2 (but was unaware of it) he is now is a
state of hesitation where he believes that there is only a probability of γ22 < 1 that the “true”
5In the process of preparation a system is put into a specific state.
6We talk about the entropy of dispersion rather than of probability distribution, because we are dealing with
a pure state. See discussion above.
7In the example “learning that the administration lacks standard of ethics” is equivalent to learning “it is
worthwhile to complaint”. The point is before the agent processed the information in his own frame (step 2), he
is not aware of this.
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eigenpicture is r∗2.8 The acquisition of new information has triggered the loss of some information
leaving the agent in a state of intrinsic uncertainty captured by a strictly positive entropy:
H
(
ϕ′
)
= −
∑
j
γ2j log γ
2
j > 0.
Proposition 1. Assume that the agent’s mental state is one eigenpicture of his preferred rep-
resentation, acquiring additional information in terms of a representation that is not compatible
with the preferred one leads to confusion measured by increased dispersion entropy.
This is the central result of this paper. When two representations are incompatible in the
agent’s mind. Additional information is not always beneficial to the agent. It is unambiguously
detrimental when the starting point is an eigenpicture of the preferred representation as illus-
trated in the argument above: the new information induces a strict loss of information implying
confusion with respect to the concerns of the agent. More generally i.e., starting from an arbi-
trary eigenpicture (with non zero dispersion entropy) as in the example below, new information
may either decrease or increase dispersion entropy.
We illustrate the result in Proposition 1 in figure 2 where the dimensionality of a repre-
sentation is 2. The broad line corresponds to the preparation stage and the thin lines to the
measurement.
Figure 2. Detrimental information
Remark 1. In our case r∗2 is true because it reflects an information congruent with R∗ and
|pi〉 is also true. The agent is not mistaken. He simply cannot hold in one single picture both
informations. The introspective operation when processing information p2 involves the whole
(cognitively limited) mind and therefore upsets earlier held beliefs.
• Classical cognition.
In order to better understand the result above let us consider the classical counter-part of
the argument above. It is well-known that the quantum model includes the classical one as a
special case when all measurements commute. It is important for the argument that follows to
understand that we are not considering all possible classical models but the classical model corre-
sponding to the quantum one where all the premises are the same except that all measurements
commute. We below discuss other possible classical approaches.
8After the introspective process, he will end up believing r∗2 with some probability less than 1.
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We next consider a classical situation where all representations are compatible in the citizen’s
mind. He can synthesize all information without constraint. Formally, this is expressed as fol-
lows. For simplicity let both P and R∗ be two dimensional as in the illustrative example of figure
2. When P and R∗ are compatible, a picture (a state) can have values in both representations si-
multaneously. This means that a state or picture can be represented as a vector in the four dimen-
sional tensor product space P ×R∗ spanned by the eigenvectors {|p1r∗1〉, |p1r∗2〉, |p2r∗1〉, |p2r∗2〉}.
Generally the picture (state of mind) ψ of the citizen is as before expressed as a superposition
of the basis vectors:
|ψ〉 = c1|p1r∗1〉+ c2|p1r∗2〉+ c3|p2r∗1〉+ c4|p2r∗2〉,
4∑
i=1
c2i = 1.
Since we are dealing with a classical agent this can be interpreted as a belief state b (a random
variable) in boolean space Ω = {ω1, ..., ω4} with ω1 = p1r∗1, ω2 = p1r∗2, ω3 = p2r∗1, ω4 = p2r∗2 :
(1) b = α1ω1 + α2ω2 + α3ω3 + α4ω4
with αi = c2i , i = 1, ..., 4 and reads as follows: the agent believes that with probability α1
the true state is ω1. Now in order to compare with the quantum case above assume that the
agent initially has an information that is completely correlated with r∗2 so prob {r∗ = r∗1} = 0
implying prob {ω = ω1} = prob {ω = ω3} = 0. The priors b0 writes
(2) b0 =
α2
α2 + α4
ω2 +
α4
α2 + α4
ω4 .
The agent now receives information in a way similar to the subsection above. So he receives
information along P, he learns p2 implying prob {p = p1} = 0 implying prob {ω = ω2} = 0 . the
agent processes that information i.e., updates his priors into posteriors
b1 = ω4.
The agent is now fully informed of the state of the world. So compared with the priors (2) there
is no loss of information as in the quantum updating case.
Proposition 2. In the classical counter-part of the quantum model, additional information never
increases the agent’s uncertainty.
Proposition 2 underlines the implications of quantum cognitive limitations. In the absence
of such limitations, i.e., when all representations are compatible in the mind of the agent, infor-
mation is always beneficial and - in the classical counter part model - it reduces entropy. While
if the citizen is cognitively limited, information can turn confusing.
Remark 2. It must be emphasized that the reasoning above relies on our assumption that we
are dealing with a classical counter part where the agent learns that r∗ = r∗2 with probability
1 (corresponding to the pure state in the quantum model). If we relax slightly this assumption
(i.e., allowing for incomplete information), the result in proposition 1 could be approached with a
classical model of a different flavor. Assume the agent has priors that puts nearly all the weight
(but not all) on r∗2 so α1 6= 0 and α3 6= 0 as in b in 1. Next, he receives information p2. If
according to the agent’s structural model, that information is highly correlated with r∗1 (which is
not the case in the original model) he updates his beliefs and puts more weight on ω1 and ω3
than he initially had. He is now less certain about what to do than he was before he got the
information. His new beliefs exhibit a distribution with higher entropy. However, he has not lost
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information as in the quantum case. Instead the interpretation is that his priors were wrong so
new information brought him closer to the truth. So a legitimate question is: are we only talking
about interpretation or do quantum cognitive limitations really have a more profound bearing on
learning?
• Oscillating for ever.
Bayesian learning operates within a Boolean algebra. The objective is to learn the parameters
of the model of the system.9 Provided the priors are not inconsistent with the true model, we
know (Schwartz 1965) that starting from any such priors Bayesian updating converges to the
true state.
With quantum learning, we are in a Hilbert space, that is there exists a variety of resolutions
of the system i.e., a variety of representations, of valid theories of the system. Those descriptions
are not alternative to each other but complementary (in the sense of Bohr). As a consequence
there exists no single true complete information state but a multiplicity of equally true maximal
information states. Therefore, the state of knowledge of a quantum minded individual does
not converge with new information but oscillates for ever. Consider again the example above.
After the agent performed the introspective measurement R∗, if the agent is being asked about his
understanding in P, he will perform a new measurement of the eigenpicture resulting from the first
measurement and p2 will not be recovered with probability 1. Performing those measurements
alternately, he will keep oscillating without converging i.e., without being able to settle for a
definite value in both P and R∗ simultaneously. 10
Of course this example is simplistic and the agent might simply remember p2. But in more
sophisticated context, we expect the modification of the mental picture to be effective. Moreover,
our focus is on the consequences for decision-making of lost information which are far from self-
evident.
2) Application: transparency in public life
We next address the issue of providing access to public information and its relationship
with transparency in terms of the theory developed above. Consider a situation where a citizen
suspects that there has been some serious wrongdoing and he must decide whether or not to
file a formal complaint against a public administration. Since that is costly to him he wants to
collect information to evaluate his chance of winning.
The government makes available information e.g., on a website. Information can be ex-
pressed and organized according various principles. For instance some information concerns
the extent of responsibility and discretion at various step of decision-making. Another informs
about the ethical rules various bureaus obey. Yet, another set of information takes the per-
spective of the personnel and informs about the conditions for recruitment and promotion. The
assumption is that the different perspectives are incompatible in the citizen’s mind. When he
thinks in moral/ethical terms, he cannot simultaneously envision the implication of the allo-
cation of responsibilities for the quality of decisions or the quality competence emerging from
9Some consider also Bayesain updating with multiple priors (see e.g., Hanany and Klibanov [12]). But there
is no consensus as to how to proceed - in sharp contrast with Bayesian updating of single priors.
10The general result is a transposition into cognition of the basic feature of quantum mechanics namely that it
is not possible for complementary properties to have a determinate value simultaneously.
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the recruitment/promotion system. Therefore we define three non-commuting operators which
for simplicity are two-valued: R1 {rule-bounded (|R〉), discretionary(|D〉)}; R2 {High ethical
standards(|E〉), No ethical standards(|U〉)}; R3 {Competent (|C〉), Incompetent(|I〉)}. We as-
sume one representation R2 is fully congruent with D the decision problem i.e., whether he
should file a complaint of not.11 The initial state can be expressed in any of the representation:
|ϕ〉 = λ11|R〉+ λ12|D〉 = λ21|E〉+ λ22|U〉 = λ31|C〉+ λ32|I〉.
In figure 3 we depict the case when the citizen learns the administration is competent (green
plain arrow) and when he learns the process is discretionary (blue plain arrow).
Figure 3. Transparency in public life; incompatible mental frames of an administration.
Recall that R∗2 (in red) is fully congruent with the requirements of decision-making. When
provided the information framed according to R1 and learning e.g., that the administration is
competent. Instead of decreasing uncertainty with respect to decision-making, the new informa-
tion actually increases uncertainty (dispersion entropy) thereby creating confusion in the agent’s
mind. The initial state (doted line) was pretty close to U, the new state C is almost equidistant
to both E and U . In contrast learning that the decision processes are discretionary (projecting
onto D) though not fully congruent, reduces decision uncertainty. As we see the extent of con-
gruence it is of paramount importance for cognitively constrained agents. In contrast with the
classical model where at worst orthogonal information is useless, we know from proposition 1
that information can be detrimental; the citizens get confused (increased dispersion entropy).
Proposition 3. The government can increase citizens’ confusion by providing information along
a representation that is little congruent with the citizens’ concerns.
This result implies that in our framework, truthful information can be used to manipulate
the citizens away from their concerns in order to affect their decisions. The next section shows
how full access to information can lead to confusion.
• Sequential information acquisition: the architecture of the website.
In this subsection we explore some implications of the results above for the architecture
of the administration’s website. Consider now a representation as a complete set of commuting
observable. So for instance in R3, beside competence (in terms of formal education), a description
of the principles for selection in recruitment, of the principles governing evaluation for promotion,
11If the citizen pictures the administration as lacking ethical standard, that comforts his suspicion and he will
definitely file a complaint. Conversely, if he is convinced the administration has high ethical standards, he will
not file.
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a description of the rules and processes to be followed is provided (from the point of view of their
complexity/simplicity), etc... Similarly for the other representations e.g., R4 provides information
about the standards for decisions, the appeal procedures etc...
Assume the website aims at providing full access to information. If the architect does not
have in mind the quantum structure of the citizens’ mind, the website will most probably be
constructed so the progression in the tree mixes elements from different representations. Each
new step entails a projection on a subspace of the representation to which the information
belongs. But as we next show that has implication for the information previously “pictured”, it
is “lost” in the updating i.e., in the necessity for the citizen to be coherent i.e., fit information
in one coherent to him picture.
To see this consider the following path. To facilitate the reading we let the eigenvalues of
R1 be labeled as ai and R2 as bi the two representations are complementary in the mind of the
citizen. Assume the citizen state is
|ψ〉 = |b1〉 =
3∑
i=1
λi|a1i〉 .
This means that his knowledge is an eigenpicture of R2, he has a determinate understanding of
the administration in that representation. Now the website guides him further with information
“non a3”. The picture of the citizen evolves from
|b1〉 =
3∑
i=1
λi|ai〉 → |ψ′〉 = λ1√
λ21 + λ
2
2
|a1〉+ λ2√
λ21 + λ
2
2
|a2〉 6= |b1〉
So the citizen is less indeterminate with respect to R1 but he lost the determination he had in
R2. With |ai〉 =
∑3
j=1 γij |aj〉 we can now write the citizen’s state of information in R2:
|ψ′〉 = λ1√
λ21 + λ
2
2
3∑
j=1
γ1j |bj〉+ λ2√
λ21 + λ
2
2
3∑
j=1
γ2j |bj〉
After redistribution in terms of the bj :
|ψ′〉 =
( λ1√
λ21 + λ
2
2
γ11 +
λ2√
λ21 + λ
2
2
γ21
)
|b1〉 +
( λ1√
λ21 + λ
2
2
γ12 +
λ2√
λ21 + λ
2
2
γ22
)
|b2〉
+
( λ1√
λ21 + λ
2
2
γ13 +
λ2√
λ21 + λ
2
2
γ23
)
|b3〉.
So we see that in R2 the citizen is represented by a relatively complex superposition of all 3
possible eigenpictures of R2. If he walks out from the website now, he is definitely more confused
than when he started: he has no clear picture of anything. Adding yet another information
belonging to a third representation will make his updating toward R2 even more difficult.
Any learning process about a sufficiently complex system proceeds by step which can be iden-
tified as the sequential acquisition of coarse information. For quantum cognitively constrained
citizens this corresponds to a sequence of preparation followed by possibly incompatible mea-
surements. The more complex the system the more likely the cognitive constraints are binding
i.e., the agent is not capable of synthesizing all information in one picture. Instead information
is organized in a number of alternative perspectives of the system corresponding to alternative
(incompatible) representations. We have the following claim
Claim i. Sequential acquisition of information can be particularly confusing if it mixes inputs
from different representations. ii. Full access to information about a complex system is generally
not beneficial to cognitively constrained agents.
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The first claim is illustrated in the example above. The second claim follows from recognizing
that the more complex a system, the more likely information about it involves a number of incom-
patible representations. The claim demonstrates the distinction between access to information
and transparency. One implication is that an ill-intentioned webarchitect while providing full
access to information can manipulate citizens so they give up their ambition to file a complaint
whatever the initial state of mind. In other words transparency can be defeated precisely by
providing full access to information.
Concluding remarks
This paper is a first exploration of learning by cognitively limited agents where the limitations
are modeled appealing to quantum like characteristics of the mind. A main motivation is that the
quantum approach has shown successful in explaining behavioral anomalies in decision-making
while it also seems able to capture concerns expressed by practitioners dealing with information
transmission and communication. In particular, the fact that i. people reason about reality
within the frame of some a representation (“mental script”) or as we call it, a mental picture, ii,
the multiplicity of potential representations of reality generates specific problems for information
transmission and learning. We model cognitive limitations in terms of the multiplicity of Bohr
complementary mental representations of one and the same reality. We find that under intrinsic
uncertainty, additional information may contribute to increasing the confusion of people. The
analysis reveals a new significance of informational congruence which allows shedding some light
on the issue of transparency in public life. In particular, we find that indeed access to information
is not equivalent to transparency and that even truthful and full access to information can be
exploited to manipulate cognitively constrained people. Future research will aim at extending
the argument to a setting with uncertainty due to both incomplete information and intrinsic
uncertainty. It will also establish the asymptotic properties of learning by quantum minded
agents and perform a systematic comparison with non-Bayesian learning models.
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